(see pp.ix - x)

IN Caesar's Conquest of Gaul (p.208, note 2) I briefly noticed a dissertation which Chr. Ebert had recently published in support of the theory that Caesar wrote each of his commentaries immediately after the campaign which it described. I may add that Meusel (Jahresberichte des philologischen Vereins zu Berlin, 1913, pp.28 - 31) has since written a searching criticism of Ebert's work, in which he supports my view, - that the seven commentaries wele written continuously after the campaign of 52 B.C.


On i, 26, §3

THE annexed diagram shows the usual arrangement of wagons in a laager. The wheels are fastened together, and thus play an important part in the defence: indeed they might have done so in any arrangement. See Lord Wolseley's Soldier's Pocket-Book, 1886, pp.409 - 10.




(see the first note on i, 29, §3)

AFTER listening to professor Delbruck's lectures, delivered at University College, London, on October 6 and 7, 1913, I thought it advisable to write a supplementary note on Caesar's statement of the numbers of the Helvetian host. The professor, who holds that Caesar habitually and deliberately exaggerated the numbers of his enemies,[1][I have myself in various notes called attention to exaggerations, which may have been due to erroneous reports. Professor Delbruck in his lectures did not specifically refer to the question of the Helvetii, which he had discussed before, See my note on i, 29, §3.] referred to a familiar sentence in his account of the destruction of Sabinus's brigade - Erant et virtute et numero pugnandi pares (v, 34, §2) - from which he concluded that the brigade was annihilated by an equal number of Gauls, and therefore that Caesar could not have defeated the Helvetii if they had been as numerous as he says. But the passage in question is notoriously corrupt and, as it stands in the MSS., untranslatable; Caesar's narrative (v, 26 - 37) shows that Sabinus's force was greatly outnumbered by the Eburones; it is incredible that Ambiorix would otherwise have ventured to attack a fortified Roman camp, situated on a commanding position; and Professor Delbruck himself justly remarked that Roman armies overcame superior numbers by superior discipline. Let us therefore test Caesar's statement about the Helvetii on its own merits.

Caesar had four veteran legions in the battle (i, 24, §2). As we have seen (7, §2), the ideal strength of a legion in his time was 6,000 men: these four legions had apparently suffered little or no loss before they went into action; and it is reasonable to slippose that immediately before the battle they numbered about 20,000. The original strength of the allied Gallic force, according to the Helvetian schedule (29, §2), was 92,000. About one-fourth had been destroyed or dispersed in the affair on the left bank of the Saone (12, §§2 - 3): the natural rate of mortality and casualties in the skirmishes recorded in 15, §3 would account for the loss of a few hundreds more. Accepting provisionally the Helvetian estimate, we may suppose that on the day of the battle the allies numbered about 68,000. Is it credible that 20,000 Roman veterans defeated 68,000 brave but undisciplined semi-barbarians? I gathered from Professor Delbruck's remarks that, considering the power of discipline, he was willing to admit that a Roman army might have defeated a Gallic force which outnumbered it in the proportion of 2 to 1 or even of 5 to 2; and I may add that the efficiency of the allied force would have been weakened by its consisting of tribal groups which lacked interdependence and cohesion. It was for this reason among others that Sir Charles Napier defeated an army of warlike Baluchis, which several times outnumbered his own, in the battle of Miani. Still, 7 to 2 is an excessive diserepancy (though if, as I believe [Caesar's Conquest of Gaul, pp.239, 630], many of the Gauls never came into action, it would have been considerably reduced); and one is the more inclined to be sceptical when one remembers that, according to Caesar's own estimate (i, 31, §§5, 10) the army of Ariovistus, which, after a hard struggle, he defeated with six legions, amounted to not more than 36,000, or perhaps about 40,000 men (see Caesar's Conquest of Gaul, pp.654 - 5 and 655, note 5). Again, Caesar tells us (i, 29, §3) that the host, including women and children, which he sent back to Helvetia numbered 110,000; and, as I have shown in Caesar's Conquuest of Gaul (pp.240 - 1), if we accept both this estimate and his abstract of the Helvetian schedule, we must infer that about 126,000 perished in the battle (!), or else that very large numbers had dispersed on the march. The former supposition at all events is utterly incredible.

Let us now consider the question with reference to the length of the Helvetian column. The Helvetii had no artillery or ammunition wagons, which occupy so much space in modern marches, but they were encumbered by numerous supply wagons. I have quoted (i, 29, §3) Napoleon's estimate, - 8,500. Flour sufficient to feed, say, 307,000 persons (see the note on i, 29, §3, and Caesar's Conquest of Gaul, p.241, note 3) is said to have been taken. A fair allowance for each man in a modern army is 11 lb. of bread or 1 lb. of biscuit per day (The Soldier's Pocket-Book, pp.96 - 7). The Helvetii, who plundered largely, doubtless ate meat as well; and the women fmd children would have needed less food than the men: so let us suppose that the average daily allowance of bread or its equivalent was 1 lb. per head. A sack of flour (280 lb.) yields at least 92 4-lb. loaves (Ency. Brit., 1910, p. 469): therefore 68 lb. of flour per head, or 20,876,000 lb. for the whole host, would have sufficed.[2][Bread, in the absence of field ovens, is evidently out of the question: perhaps the emigrants made their flour into porridge. We are not told that the Rauraci, Tulingi, Latobrigi, and Boi took any flour with them; but I assume that they did not depend upon plunder.] Over very bad roads two horses will draw a load (exclusive of the wagon) of 1,900 lb. (The Soldier's Pocket-Book, p. 70), and 4 bullocks will draw 2,000 lb. (ib.).). Caesar (i, 3, ) says that the Helvetii used iumenta, by which he may have meant not only horses but also mules and oxen. 10,987 two-horse wagons or 10,438 bullock-carts could have carlied the grain. Of the former, 160 in single file would have covered a mile; of the latter 117 (The Soldier's Pocket-Book, p.340). Thus the length of the wagon-train in single file would have been from 68 to 88 miles. Moving four abreast (see the note on i, 29, §3), they would have occupied from 17 to 22 miles, and after the defeat of the rear-guard from 13 to 17.[3][I According to Froissart (Hamley, Operations of War, p.11), a train of 6,000 wagons in one of Edward III's wars stretched `upwards of two leagues', or 5 miles. If the figures are correct, there must have been 7 or 8 abreast.] We must, however, allow at least 20 per cent.for inevitable opening out (The Soldier's Pocket-Book, p.324); so let us say from 16 to 21. The length of the column of emigrants, if all had gone on foot and marched, like a modern army on a fenced road, four abreast, would have been, after the defeat of the rear-guard, with due allowance for opening out, about 45 miles. But the modern army is obliged to leave room for the passage of orderlies, vehicles, &c.; and we may be sure that the Helvetii marched with a much broader front. In open country Roman armies occasionally marched in a quadratum agmen - baggage train flanked on either Side by infantry - and Sometimes, as Polybius says (vi, 40, §§10 - 12), in three parallel columns. Moreovel; many of the emigrants may have tramped alongside of the wagons, as Wellington's troops did in their retreat from Quatre Bras (Hamley, Operations of War, p.29); and as the wagons became emptied, women and children would have ridden in them.

But Professor Delbruck will not admit that several wagons moved abreast (see Caesar's Conquest of Gaul, p.239). He insists that they must have moved in single file, not only on account of defiles (see the note on 29, §3), but also because the roads were bad and discipline was lax. I do not think that these reasons are sufficient. When Caesar says (i, 6, ) that the defile between the Jura and the Rhone `was so narrow and difficult that carts could barely pass along it one at a time', does he not imply that elsewhere they could move abreast? Wagons can go two abreast on almost all roads (Soldier's Pocket-Book, p.408); oxen can draw wagons where there are no roads (ib., p.78); and Gallic roads were at all events good enough to allow large numbers of wagons to travel over them notwithstanding disorder and lack of discipline (viii, 14, §2; B. C., i, 51, §§1 - 2). A bad road, wide enough to allow two or more wagons to move abreast, will present the same obstacles to one file of wagons as to two. Perhaps in some places tolerably firm ground was not sufficiently wide to allow more than two wagons to move abreast - and here delay would have arisen;[4][I doubt whether Captain Veith's suggestion - that many wagons were abandoned (see the note on 29, §3) - is admissible. Wagons were doubtless lost, owing to breakages and the weakness of draught cattle which could not get enough to eat, but were they not too valuable to be needlessly abandoned?] but this, as I have remarked in the note on 29, §3, would not have increased the length of the train. The emigrants must, however, have taken some baggage with them,[5][Napoleon III argued that more than 2,000 wagons would have been required for baggage.] and they must have been accompanied by their droves of cattle. The length of the column, then, presents a difficulty which, if not insuperable, is at least serious.

Anyhow, as the reader will have seen, I do not believe that 92,000 men started on the expedition. If we were to reduce this number by one-third, we should probably be nearer the truth. I see no reason to distrust Caesar's abstract of the Helvetian schedule; but, as I have suggested in Caesar's Conquest of Gaul (p.241), it may only represent a census of the population, many of whom perhaps declined to emigrate. That Helvetia was left absolutely uninhabited I can hardly conceive.

[Readers who examine the plan of the battle-field (facing p.25) will perceive that when Stoffel indicated a site for the Helvetian encampment, he was thinking of the Helvetian fighting men only. The laager marked in the plan could not have consisted of more than a few hundred wagons, for its perimeter is barely two kilometres. Stoffel of course supposes that only the leading wagons were parked.]


On ii, 8, §4

SOME readers may desire a fuller explanation of tormenta than that which my footnote gives. The accompanying illustration should make everything clear. It will be seen that the two arms of the engine were passed through the skeins of twisted cordage. A block, furnished with a hook which held the bowstring and which was itself held down by a trigger, could slide up and down in the groove. When the engine was loaded the block was forced back, despite the resisting cordage, by a windlass, and fixed by a catch which fitted into a row of teeth whell the missile was to be discharged the trigger was pressed, the bowstring was released, the recoil of the cordage caused the arms to fly back, and the missile sped on its way.


On iv, 19, §4 and vi, 29,

In a suggestive article on the operations of Caesar and Drusus in Germany (Journal des Savants, 1913, pp.6 - 7) M.Jullian argues that Caesar intended to conquer Germany as well as Gaul - `If', he says, `Caesar crossed the Rhine twice if in one year [53 B.C.] he established camps and redoubts on the further bank, if he assembled his entire army and a considerable quantity of stores, we may be sure that it was not for idle demonstrations.' Then, remarking that while we are acquainted, on the one hand, with Caesar's military movements and on the other with the contemporary political events in Rome, we are ignorant of the connexion between the former and the latter, he concludes `that it was due to Rome, to Cato, and to Domitius that Julius Caesar did not penetrate into Germany.'

I cannot share this belief. The reasons which Caesar gives for having re-crossed the Rhine in 55 and again in 53 B.C. seem to me more probable than those which M. Jullian imagines. For in the former year Caesar was obliged to prepare for his invasion of Britain (iv, 20, ), in the latter he had more than enough to do in suppressing the insurrections of the tribes of North-Eastern Gaul; it seems to me incredible that a statesman who understood so well what was possible should ever have dreamed of embarking upon an impracticable and insane enterprise and if he returned from Germany because he dreaded the machinations of Cato or Domitius, some messenger must have conveyed to Rome the news of his expedition and from Rome to Germany the news of his enemies' intentions, for which movements there was not sufficient time.


On iv, 28, §§2 - 3

IN the Classical Journal of 1911 (pp.76 - 79) Mr. AlfredR.Wightman discussed the passage (iv, 28, §§2 - 3) in which Caesar describes what befell his cavalry transports, and incidentally criticized my explanation. Commenting on the interpretation of tamen - `notwithstanding' (the gale) - which I have given, in common with Kraner-Dittenberger and other editors, Mr.Wightman says that `the sailors ... cast anchor ... not because the desirability of remaining off the coast of Britain was just then uppermost in their minds, but because they were under the instant need of ... avoiding shipwreck'. I maintain, on the contrary, that they cast anchor because they purposed to remain in a position from which they might be able, when the gale ceased, to reach their destination, - the coast of Britain, near Caesar's camp. But, says Mr. Wightman, `if the storm was so violent that the transports were falling to leeward in spite of all efforts to hold them on their course [what efforts? Caesar does not mention any.], one might naturally expect that when rounded up and swung head to at anchor they would pitch so heavily as to put their bows under.' No doubt they did pitch heavily; and no doubt this explains why, as Caesar says, they `were becoming water-logged' (fluctibus complerentur).

Mr.Wightman then proceeds to deal with me. On p.319 of Ancient Britain I wrote, `The ships which were swept down past the Foreland and the Dover cliffs scudded before the north-easterly gale; and although they were evidently in no danger of being driven ashore, they were in great peril because only the most watchful steering could prevent them from broaching to: if a heavy sea struck the stern, it might swing the vessel round, and in a moment she would overset and founder. The ships which were carried back to the point from which they had started were of course handled differently,' &c. Again, on p.582, speaking of the transports that ran before the wind, I wrote, `They were in no danger of being driven ashore; for while the gale was at its height they stood out to sea.' Referring to the latter passage, Mr.Wightman says, `This reasoning seems to me inconsequent. When Caesar says the ships were being carried out of their course, all we are to understand therefrom is that they were falling rapidly to leeward; and as he plainly tells us land was under their lee bow, the danger to which he refers is obviously that of striking. To avert this it was necessary to tack ship and stand off shore. But the fact that they did this while the gale was still at its height does not warrant the assumption that they were ill no danger of being driven ashore when on the other tack standing westward.'

The radical error in this criticism lies in the words `as he plainly tells us land was under their lee bow, the danger to which he refers is obviously that of striking'. Caesar does not tell us that `land was under their lee bow'. What he does tell ns is that `they were getting close to Britain and were seen from the camp, when such a violent storm suddenly arose that none of them could keep their course, but some were carried back to the point from which they had started, while others were swept down in great peril[6][Mr. Wightman cavils at my translation of magno suo cum periculo, which he would render by `at (or `to their') great peril'. What is the essential difference? Were the Roman traders not in danger when they crossed the Alps magno cum periculo (iii, 1, §2)? Or Cicero's troops when they were defending their camp (v, 52, §8)? Does Mr.Wightman mean that the ships were not in peril? He cannot mean this; for he says himself that `the danger to which he [Caesar] refers is obviously that of striking', and that we must not assume `that they were in no danger of being driven ashore'. If they were `in danger of being driven ashore', why does Mr. Wightman find fault with my translation? And why did their captains fatuously incur this danger, when all that they had to do, in order to avoid it, was immediately to follow the example of the other group of transports, - `tack ship and stand off shore'?][][Perhaps Mr. Wightman, although his own words imply that the ships were in danger, means that they would only have been in danger if they had approached so near a lee shore that striking would have been inevitable. But if so, the word `danger' would be inadequate. Anyhow in all the other passages in which Caesar uses the phrase magno (or quanto) cum periculo - i, 10, §2; 17, §6; 47, §3; iii, 1, §2; v, 16, §2; 19, §2; 47, §5; 52, §3; vii, 14, §7 - he plainly means that the individuals or groups in question were in danger.][][Of course in certain passages, e.g. iii, 1, §2, magno cum periculo might advantageously be translated, with no essential difference of meaning, by `at great risk'.] towards the lower and more westerly part of the island' (quae cum adpropinquarent Britanniae et ex castris viderentur, tanta tempestas subito coorta est ut nulla earum cursum tenere posset, sed aliae eodem unde erant profectae referrentur, aliae ad inferiorem partem insulae, quae est propius solis occasum, magno suo cum periculo deicerentur). The camp, as I have shown in Ancient Britain, was at Walmer. This conclusion has been generally accepted; and Mr. Wightman does not gainsay it. Indeed unless the camp was somewhere in East Kent, no lee shore can by any ingenuity be discovered; and supposing that when the storm arose the transports were a little south of Walmer - say somewhere near the point where the South Sand Head Light Vessel is now moored - they were obviously in no danger of beillg driven ashore by a north-easterly gale: they would have been driven through the Dover Strait into the Channel. If Mr. Wightman does not know the British coast, let him consult a map, and he will see that the only lee shore to which he can point is the shore of East Kent. But this is out of the question, not only for the reason which I have just given, but also for others: - first, the ships had been making for East Kent, but when the storm arose they could not keep their course; secondly, the ships with which we are concerned were swept down towards `the lower and more westerly part of the island'. When they were running in what was, as Mr. Wightman himself says, a `south-westerly direction' and before whnt he rightly calls `a north-easter',[7][A wind blowing from the nortll-east off Walmer or Kingsdown would be diverted a point or two southward off the south coast.] they were evidently in no danger of striking either the British coast or the Gallic coast;[8][Caesar's words - ad inferiorem ... deicerentur - show that the course of the ships was roughly parallel with the British coast, not diagonal in the direction of Cape La Hague. Moreover, I need hardly say that the skippers had no intention of running 170 miles.] and the nearest lee shore was the shore of Central America, or, possibly, one of the Bermudas! Mr. Wightman insists that `deici applied to ships refers, not to their scudding before a gale with plenty of sea-room ... but to their being swept down upon some danger point to leeward'. It may refer to either: anyhow in this case the `danger point' was 3,000 miles or more away.

`Yet', continues Mr. Wightman, `aside from all this, Mr.Holmes's theory breaks down on internal evidence. If two methods of procedure were open to the Gallic sailors - either to run before the wind or lie to - why, I ask, after pursuing the former method for a time, did they subsequently anchor?' Evidently, I reply, because they did not want to be driven into the Atlantic and did want to land the cavalry. `If', Mr. Wightman continues, `there was plenty of sea-room ... no real sailor, having once started to run before the wind, would ever think of casting anchor except he had got into some sheltered position.' Precisely what these Gallic sailors had done; that is to say, they had got into a comparatively sheltered position. There are several points off the southern coast of Kent where, owing to the high ground, the force of a north-easterly gale would have been in some measure broken, though, as it turned out, the shelter was not enough. But, Mr. Wightman insists, `to anchor was a blunder, and blunder number two if the vessels had really been running before the wind, for by so doing the shipmasters had not only wasted time and effort but had put themselves in a position which, as regards laying their course back to the continent, was much worse than that they occupied when it came on to blow. They were now forced to close-haul from a point just so much further dead to leeward. Compared with their fellows in the other group of transports what a mess they had made of it - according to Mr. Holmes.'

Yes and, what is more important, according to Caesar. Certainly to anchor was a blunder, in the sense that it was an attempt which failed, - a blunder which the `shipmasters' committed because they clung to the hope of being able to achieve the object of their voyage by landing the cavalry, which Caesar was anxiously awaiting. How much further to leeward they were when they began `to close-haul' we do not know, - perhaps not more than a few miles; and since they got safely back to the continent, what did it matter? But what is truly amazing is that Mr. Wightman fails to see that if, as he maintains, they did not commit this `blunder' and if, as he implies, the vessels had not `really been running before the wind', they acted in exactly the same way as `the other group of transports', whereas it is clear from Caesar's narrative that they acted quite differently. The only way of escape open to Mr. Wightman is to suppose that the `shipmasters', with their eyes open, allowed their ships to drift helplessly towards `some danger point to leeward', but at last, when the danger of striking became imminent, woke up and put them on the other tack! Let us see how Mr. Wightman absolves them from the charge of having `made a mess of it'. `I venture', he says, `to suggest that anchors were not thrown out at all; that the ablative absolute [ancoris iactis] here puts a hypothetical case merely; that tamen sets over against their [the seamen's] present peril the danger involved in casting anchor ... that the subjunctive complerentur is one of Ideal Certainty, being future to a past tense ... . Accordingly I should render ``And though they were to cast anchor, still since in that case they would fill, these latter, as their only resource, standing to sea even in the face of night, headed for the continent''.'

Can the reader follow Mr. Wightman's argument? He asserts that the transports `had been caught by a gale ... on a lee shore. What', he asks, `was to be done? Two courses of action were open - to cast anchor, or to put to sea'. Mr. Wightman says that they did not cast anchor: therefore he evidently means that they put to sea. Certainly they put to sea, - `in the face of night'; but, whether they anchored or not, before they put to sea `they were swept down magno suo cum periculo towards the lower and more westerly part of the island'. Evidently, then, when they stood out to sea `in the face of night' they were `forced to close-haul from a point just so much further dead to leeward', and the shipmasters had `put themselves in a position which, as regards laying their course back to the continent, was much worse than that they occupied when it came on to blow'. But, I repeat, since they were swept towards `the lower and more westerly part of the island' - in other words, down the Channel - there was no `danger point to leeward' within 3,000 miles. What, then, was this `danger point to leeward'? What was the `lee shore'? We have seen that, if it existed at all, it could only have been East Kent. But Mr. Wightman will hardly maintain that East Kent was `the more westerly part of the island' or that the shipmasters would have been mad enough to let the ships drift towards East Kent even for one minute. If the wind had blown them towards that `danger point', they would immediately have acted like their comrades of `the other group' and made for the continent.


On vi, 21 - 4

CAESAR'S description of the manners and customs of the Germans is perhaps not altogether trustworthy: for he only spent a few weeks in Germany, never moving far from the Rhine; we may suppose that he depended for information principally upon Gallic traders (i, 39, §1), though he may have learned something from the friendly Ubii; and it would seem that he ascribed to the Germans in general the characteristics which, according to his informants, belonged to the Suebi. It has been argued that the nomadic tribes of vhom he speaks (i, 36, §7; iv, 1, §2; 4, §§1 - 2) could not have practised the agriculture which is described in iv, 1, §§4 - 6; but does not he himself expressly say (iv, 1, §2) that they were prevented from doing so? See W.Fleischmann, Caesar ... und die Deutsche Landwirtschaft, 1911, and the reviews of that work in Berliner philologische Wochenschrift, 1913, col.74 - 6, and Jahresberichte des philologischen Vereins zu Berlin, 1913, p.60.


On vii, 3,

CAESAR was evidently prepared on occasion to pay for the corn which he requisitioned from the Gallic tribes; for in i, 16, §6 he writes graviter eos accusat, quod, cum [frumentum] neque emi neque ex agris sumi possit &c.; and the negotiatores who had settled at cenabum may have contracted, as negotiatores did under the Empire, to supply the army. On the other hand, he of course took without payment from rebellious tribes the corn which he required. Probably he only paid when he could not afford to give offence. Cf v, 41, §5 and Tacitus, Agricola, 19.



THE `sheets' which I recommend belong, when no scale is mentioned, to the Carte de France (1). The scale 1 is that of the Carte de l'etat-Major.

It would be well worth while to visit the Musee des Antiquites Nationales (especially Salle XIII) at St.Germainen-Laye, which may be reached from Paris (St.Lazare) in 40 minutes. The various sites which I recommend are

1. Bibracte (Mont Beuvray). - Paris (Gare de Lyon) to Etang, changing at Nevers. From Etang drive to St.Legersous-Beuvray. Sheet 41.

2. Armecy (i, 24, §1). - Etang to Toulon-sur-Arroux. Or drive from St.Leger-sous-Beuvray. Sheet 41, or sheet 136 SE. (1).

3. The probable site of the battle with Ariovistus (i, 48, §1). - Strasburg to Rappoltsweiler (43 minutes). The alternative site mentioned in my note is near Thann, 39 minutes from Muhlhausen. Sheets 28 and 36.

4. Mauchamp and Pontavert (ii, 8, §§3 - 5). - Paris (Gare du Nord) to Soissons: thence by light railway to Pontavert, changing at Roucy. From the plateau of Chaudardes walk or drive to Mauchamp. Return to Soissons by train from Berry-au-Bac. Sheet 17.

5. The battle-field of Neuf-Mesnil (ii, 18, ). - Paris (Gare du Nord) to Hautmont or Maubeuge, which may also be reached without changing from Namur or Huy (the station near Mont Falhize). Sheet 5.

6. Namur and Mont Falhize (ii, 29, §2). - See p.409.

7. Octodurus (Martigny) is accessible by rail either from Lausanne or from Chamonix. See the first note on iii, 1, §6 and p. 434 (Veragri).

8. Atuatuca. - The site, as I have shown (p.407), is uncertain. Tongres, with which it is generally identified, may be reached in 45 minutes from Liege. The supposed magna corwallis (v, 32, §1), close to Koninxheim, is less than two miles south-west of Tongres.

9. Avaricum (Bourges) may be reached without changing from Paris (Quai d'Orsay). For the surrounding country see sheet 122 (1).

10. Gergovia. - Paris or Bourges to Clermont-Ferrand. See the second note on vii, 36, . Sheet 52.

11. The site of the cavalry combat with Vercingetorix. - Near Dijon. See the second note on vii, 68, §2. Sheet 34.

12. Alesia (Mont Auxois). - Paris (Gare de Lyon) or Dijon to Les Laumes. Sheet 34.

13. Mont St.Marc (viii, 9, §2; 20, ). - Paris (Gare du Nord) to Compiegne for Choisy: Compiegne to Rethondes (9 minutes) for Mont St.Marc. Sheet 33 NW. (1).

14. Uxellodunum (pp.432 - 3). - Paris (Quai d'Orsay) to St. Denis-pres-Martel. Change at Limoges. Sheet 183 SE. (1)

Mr. Scholefield, of 54, Bedford Square, W.C., has constructed for me and in accordance with my notes (iv, 17) a model on the scale of 1 of one truss of Caesar's bridge over the Rhine, and is prepared to send a facsimile of it for 10s.6d. (post free) to any of my readers who may care to possess one.